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Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law
Richard A. Posnert
The "law-and-economics" movement continues to grow, con-
tinues to be a focus of controversy, and continues-or so it seems to
me-to be widely misunderstood. Perhaps, therefore, another arti-
cle seeking to explain the movement is warranted.' In addition to
serving as an introduction to (but by no means a comprehensive
review of) a large and rapidly expanding scholarly literature, this
article will discuss some abuses of economics in law. "Abuse," of
course, is a word of at least two meanings, only one of which is
"misuse." I confess to being more conscious of the abuse heaped
upon the law-and-economics movement than of the occasional mis-
use of economics in law, but I shall give examples of both types of
abuse after first discussing what seem to me to be some fruitful uses.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
The economic analysis of law has two branches, both of which
date from the emergence of economics as a distinct field of scholar-
ship in the eighteenth century. One branch, which dates back at
least to Adam Smith, is the economic analysis of laws regulating
explicit markets-laws regulating the "economic system" in the
conventional sense. The other branch, which can be said to have
t Lee and Brena Freeman Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This article is
an expanded version of a talk given to the Section on Jurisprudence of the American Associa-
tion of Law Schools on January 5, 1979. 1 am indebted to Paul Bator; Kenneth Dam, Richard
Epstein, Frank Michelman, and George Stigler for their helpful comments on a previous
draft.
' See Klevorick, Law and Economic Theory: An Economist's View, 65-2 Am. EcoN. REv.
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originated with the work of Jeremy Bentham in the generation fol-
lowing Smith, is the economic analysis of laws regulating nonmar-
ket behavior-accidents, crimes, marriage, pollution, and the legal
and political processes themselves.
The first branch has developed in step with the maturing of
economics as a science and the expansion of government regulation
of the marketplace. Adam Smith remarked on conspiracies in re-
straint of trade; the vast expansion in antitrust activity in the last
50 years has brought into existence a highly sophisticated body of
antitrust economics. A similar historical development can be traced
in such fields as public utility regulation, patents and copyrights,
taxation, and the regulation of corporate finance and international
trade.
The other branch of the economic analysis of law-the econom-
ics of nonmarket legal regulation-has had a more checkered his-
tory. It began on a very high plane with the work of Bentham.
Whatever one thinks of Benthamism as an ethical system or a politi-
cal program, its scientific importance is considerable. Bentham was
one of the earliest and, until recently, one of the only thinkers who
believed that people acted as rational maximizers of their self-
interest in every area of life. He believed, in other words, that the
economic model, which on one view2 is simply the working out of the
implications of assuming that people are rational maximizers of
their satisfactions, was applicable throughout the whole range of
human activity, rather than confined to explicit markets.3 Ben-
tham's method is exhibited at its most characteristic in his discus-
sion of criminal punishment." Since people, he assumed, are ra-
tional maximizers in regard to the decision whether to commit a
crime as well as whether to sell a horse, the problem of crime control
is to establish a set of "prices" for crime by manipulating the two
variables that determine the cost of punishment to the (potential)
criminal: the severity of the punishment and the probability that it
will be inflicted.
2 See text at note 14 infra.
3 Bentham wrote: "NATURE has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign
masters, pain and pleasure. . . . They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think."
J. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORASS
AND LEGISLATION 125 (W. Harrison ed. 1960). "Men calculate, some with less exactness,
indeed, some with more: but all men calculate. I would not say, that even a madman does
not calculate." Id. at 298.
1 See Bentham's Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation in id. at 4.
Although Bentham's economic analysis of crime was anticipated by Beccaria, Beccaria's
analysis was far less systematic than Bentham's. See C. BECCARiA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND
PUNIsHMENTs 94 (2d Am. ed. E. Ingraham ed. 1819).
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Bentham's immediate successors in economics did not share his
capacious view of the scope of the economic model. I do not mean
that his theory of punishment was not influential; it was. But it was
influential with lawyers and penologists rather than with econo-
mists, with the result that the theory itself remained undeveloped
and untested until revived by Gary Becker in 1968.5 As is usually
the case in the history of scientific thought, one can find anticipa-
tions of the current interest in the economics of nonmarket behav-
ior: Sidgwick's discussion of externalities in 18836 and Mitchell's
discussion of household production in 19127 are examples. But the
overwhelming interest of economists was, until recently, in the oper-
ation and regulation of explicit markets, so it is not surprising that
a comprehensive economics of law failed to emerge.
The publication of three essays in the economics of nonmarket
behavior between 1959 and 1962 may be taken, somewhat arbitrar-
ily to be sure, to mark the rebirth of the economic analysis of non-
market law. These were Becker's monograph on racial discrimina-
tion,' Calabresi's first article on torts,' and Coase's article on social
cost.10 The first two pieces showed that two forms of nonmarket
conduct that had been subjected to extensive legal regula-
tion-racial discrimination and accidents-could be analyzed fruit-
fully in economic terms. Coase's article, which demonstrated that
the effect of property and liability rules on resource allocation de-
pends on the costs of transacting around the rules, provided an
indispensable tool for the economic analysis of legal rights and lia-
bilities. Coase also suggested, although he did not stress, that the
common-law courts had devised rules that promoted efficient re-
source allocation-that they had in fact displayed greater economic
insight than professional economists.
There was little further work on the legal regulation of nonmar-
ket behavior for several years. The current period of sustained and
rapidly expanding scholarly activity can be dated-again rather
arbitrarily-from the publication in 1968 of Becker's paper on the
'See text and note at note 11 infra.
'See H. SIDGWICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 406-08 (3d ed. 1901).
7 Mitchell, The Backward Art of Spending Money, 2 AM. ECON. REv. 269 (1912),
reprinted in W. MITCHELL, THE BACKWARD ART OF SPENDING MONEY, AND OTHER ESSAYS at 3
(1950).
G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1959).
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499
(1961).
" Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
1979]
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economics of crime and punishment." Since then, studies have ap-
peared applying economics to civil and criminal procedure, deter-
rence, judicial administration, law enforcement, legal precedent,
tort and contract law, freedom of speech, family law, maritime law,
commercial law, arbitration, remedies, and other areas that have
traditionally (although somewhat surprisingly, in the case of con-
tract and commercial law) been treated as areas of nonmarket regu-
lation. 2 At the same time, the economic analysis of the legal regula-
tion of explicit markets-in energy, in inventions, in the cable-
television industry, in ocean resources, and in other areas too nu-
merous to mention-has continued to develop and expand. Eco-
nomic analysis of the political (including regulatory) process itself
has also made great strides in this period.1 3
The economic analysis of nonmarket legal regulation can be
viewed as part of the larger movement in economics towards appli-
cation of the economic model to an ever greater range of human
behavior and social institutions-to information, marriage, educa-
tion, and many other phenomena that lie outside of the "economic
system" as it is conventionally defined. This movement, which in-
volves a redefinition of economics from the study of the economic
system to the study of rational choice, is controversial, and some of
the controversy is directly relevant to the question of the economic
approach to law. I shall eschew this larger controversy," however,
and confine my attention to the special problems of the economics
of law.
II. PosrrIvE AND NORMATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
The field of law and economics is too large to be surveyed ade-
" Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POLITICAL ECON. 169
(1968).
12 See, for example, the authorities cited in notes 33-41 infra.
13 For a brief overview of the law-and-economics field, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 15-23 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW]; Posner, supra note 1. For an early effort to discuss a range of legal
problems in mainly economic perspectives, see G. TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAW (1971).
The second edition of Economic Analysis of Law conveys a sense of the current scope of the
field-although after only two years the book is somewhat out of date. See, e.g., Goetz &
Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle, in THE ECONOM-
ICS OF CONTRACT LAW at 194 (A. Kronman & R. Posner eds. 1978); Kronman, Mistake, Disclo-
sure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, in id. at 114; Priest, Breach and Remedy for
the Tender of Nonconforming Goods, in id. at 167; authorities cited in notes 34-38, 40-41 &
57 infra.
'1 On which compare G. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976)
(especially the Introduction), with Coase, Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, 7 J. LEGAL
STuD. 201 (1978).
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quately in a short article, but a few distinctions may help orient the
reader. One that I have already touched on is the distinction be-
tween the analysis of laws regulating explicit markets and those that
regulate nonmarket behavior. Another important distinction is be-
tween normative and positive economic analysis of law-between
the use of economic analysis to argue for what should be and the use
of economic analysis to explain what is or has been or to predict
what will be. This distinction is illustrated by the contrast between
Guido Calabresi's work on tort law and my own. Professor Cala-
bresi's work has been mainly normative, especially in his book The
Costs of Accidents"5 and the articles leading up to it."6 He wants to
show how society can better control accidents by adopting a struc-
ture of rules and institutions based primarily on econoinics. A re-
former in the Bentham tradition, Calabresi is highly critical of the
existing system of accident liability-the tort system-because he
regards it as an obstacle to the adoption of his version of optimal
accident regulation. My approach to torts is different. I have been
interested primarily in discovering to what extent the tort system
supports the hypothesis that common-law rules and institutions
tend to promote economic efficiency. My 1972 article A Theory of
Negligence7 attempted to test that hypothesis by a detailed exami-
nation of tort decisions in the period 1875-1905; subsequent work
has elaborated on that study."8 My interest in the tort system is, in
short, positive and Calabresi's normative.
The distinction between positive and normative, between ex-
plaining the world as it is and trying to change it to make it better,
is basic to understanding the law-and-economics movement. Yet it
is a distinction lawyers have difficulty getting straight because they
are inveterately normative, and it is a common source of confusion
because many of the criticisms that are properly leveled at norma-
tive economic analysis are inapplicable to positive economic analy-
sis. For example, that it may be hard to show that "efficient" is a
synonym for "good" does not bear, at least directly, on the question
whether the hypothesis that the common law is efficiency-
promoting is supported by the evidence.
A different, but related, distinction in law and economics is
between the study of regulated and of regulating behavior. The
economist can study an activity regulated by the legal system or he
" G. CALABRESI, THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
, See id. at 5 n.4.
" See Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
See EcONowuc ANALYSS OF LAW 119-61; authorities cited in note 40 infra.
1979]
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can study the regulatory activity of the system. An example of the
first is the study of the incidence of crime as a function of the
certainty or severity of criminal punishment; an example of the
second is the study of the structure of criminal penalties. Studies
of regulated behavior, although often strictly positive in content and
purpose, have an important role in the formulation of policy and
thus contribute to the normative economic analysis of law. For ex-
ample, economic studies of the deterrent effect of criminal sanc-
tions 9 are plainly relevant to the question how severe criminal sanc-
tions should be. Similarly, recent theoretical and empirical studies
suggesting that competition among states for incorporations will not
result in corporation codes that unduly favor shareholder over credi-
tor interests or majority over minority shareholders 20 have an ines-
capable relevance to the movement for a federal corporation code. 21
In the economics of legal regulation of explicit markets, the norma-
tive use of positive analysis is also common. Much of the research
in antitrust economics, for example, consists of demonstrating a
nonmonopolistic reason for some challenged business practice. The
implication of such research, whether or not the researcher notes it,
is that the practice should not be forbidden.
The use of economics to support legal policy recommendations
may seem to raise inescapably the issue of the adequacy of econom-
ics as a normative system, but it does not.2 The economist who
demonstrates that criminals respond to incentives and hence com-
mit fewer crimes when penalties are made more severe is not en-
gaged in normative analysis. His demonstration has normative sig-
nificance only insofar as the people who think normatively about
criminal punishment consider its behavioral effects relevant to the
"1 See note 82 infra.
20 See ECONOmiC ANALYSIS OF LAW 306-07; Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection,
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUn. 251 (1977); P. Dodd & R. Leftwich, The
Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" vs. Federal Regulation (Oct., 1978)
(Working Paper Series No. MERC 78-06, U. Rochester, Grad. Sch. Management, on file with
The University of Chicago Law Review).
21 There are, of course, many other examples of policy-oriented legal-economic studies.
Recently, John Langbein and I have used the findings of modem financial theory to suggest
a reinterpretation of trust investment law that would permit trustees to invest in index or
market mutual funds, Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law: II,
1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1; Elizabeth Landes and I have proposed that an
efficient response to the black market in babies for adoption would be to permit the sale
of babies by natural to adoptive parents, E. Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STuD. 32a (1978). Some other recent policy recommendations founded
on economic analysis are discussed in Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic
Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1015, 1028-29 (1978).
22 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal
Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 109-10 (1979).
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design of a just punishment system. In measuring economic costs
and benefits, the economist qua economist is not engaged in the
separate task of telling policymakers how much weight to assign to
economic factors.
I do not mean that this separate task is uninteresting or unim-
portant, but only that it is not a part of economics as such. In a
recent paper I pointed out some advantages that I believe the effi-
ciency criterion has over competing normative criteria, including
the greatest-happiness principle of classical utilitarianism.2 But
such a demonstration is not essential to the ordinary normative uses
to which economic analysis is put. So long as it is accepted that the
economist can measure costs and that costs are relevant to policy,
economics has an important role to play in debates over legal re-
form.
I. THE PosrrivE ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE COMMON LAW
A
I am personally less interested in normative economic analysis
of law in any form than in positive economic analysis of law.
"Positive analysis" refers, as I have suggested, to the attempt to
understand and explain, rather than improve, the world. Explana-
tion is the domain of science, and economics is the science of ra-
tional human behavior. It should be possible to study behavior regu-
lated by the legal system and even the behavior of the system itself
through the methods of economics viewed as a science rather than
as an ideology or ethical system. 4
Some commentators, however, continue to deny the possibility
of social science. Among them are academic lawyers such as Grant
Gilmore and Arthur Leff. Professor Gilmore wrote recently:
For two hundred years we have been in thrall to the eighteenth-
century hypothesis that there are, in social behavior and in
societal development, patterns which recur in the same way
that they appear to recur in the physical universe.
• . . [T]he hypothesis is itself in error. Man's fate will
forever elude the attempts of his intellect to understand it. The
accidental variables which hedge us about effectively screen
the future from our view. The quest for the laws which will
" See id. at 119-36.
24 In this connection I take note of a recent book by a philosopher of science who con-
cludes that economics is a genuine science in the same sense as physics and other natural
sciences. See A. ROSENBRG, MICROECONOMIc LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYsIs (1976).
1979]
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explain the riddle of human behavior lead us not toward truth
but toward the illusion of certainty, which is our curse. So far
as we have been able to learn, there are no recurrent patterns
in the course of human event; it is not possible to make scien-
tific statements about history, sociology, economics-or law.2
The strategy of Gilmore and Leff is a curious one. Instead of analyz-
ing the positive economic analysis of law on its merits-examining
its theoretical consistency, its ability to explain data, and so
forth-they address, necessarily in very general terms, the much
larger question whether it is possible to treat any branch of human
behavior in a scientific fashion. A concrete demonstration of where
and how the positive economic analysis of law fails would be more
persuasive than the attempt of Gilmore and Leff to dismiss the
whole of social science.
The positive economic analysis of law has, as I mentioned ear-
lier, two facets. One, the study of behavior regulated by the legal
system, is illustrated by William Landes's pioneering study of the
courts.26 Landes examined how parties to litigation respond to the
constraints that the litigation process imposes on them, as distin-
guished from examining the economic basis of the litigation rules
and procedures themselves. Studies of behavior regulated by the
legal system generally take for granted the system itself-the struc-
ture of penalties, the rules of procedure, and so on-and ask how the
individuals caught up in the system respond to the constraints that
it places on their behavior. A separate branch of the positive eco-
nomic analysis of law, in which I have been particularly interested,
seeks to explain not the behavior of the individuals and firms regu-
lated by the legal system but the structure of the system itself.
Scholars engaged in this branch of the positive economic analy-
sis of law have advanced the hypothesis that the rules, procedures,
and institutions of the common or judge-made law-in sharp con-
trast to much legislative and constitutional rulemaking-promote
efficiency.2 The hypothesis is not that the common law does or
could perfectly duplicate the results of competitive markets; 2 it is
that, within the limits of administrative feasibility, the law brings
G. GiLMoRE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 99-100 (1977), quoted in Leff, Law and, 87
YALE L.J. 989, 1010 (1978) (footnote omitted).
2$ Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971).
" For a succinct statement of the hypothesis by an interested though skeptical observer
see Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial
Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 145-46, 201-06 (1977-78).
nSee ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 402-03; Diamond & Maskin, An Equilibrium Analysis
of Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States, 10 BELL J. ECON. 282 (1979).
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the economic system closer to producing the results that effective
competition-a free market operating without significant external-
ity, monopoly, or information problems-would produce.
The efficiency hypothesis in its original form was largely de-
scriptive or empirical: little effort was devoted to explaining why,
and through what mechanism, the law might have become an in-
strument for promoting efficiency. Demsetz's early discussion of the
emergence of individual property rights in primitive legal systems
under the pressure of increasing resource scarcity illustrates the sort
of explanation that seemed adequate at the time:
I do not mean to assert or to deny that the adjustments in
property rights which take place need be the result of a con-
scious endeavor to cope with new externality problems. These
adjustments have arisen in Western societies largely as a result
of gradual changes in social mores and in common law prece-
dents. At each step of this adjustment process, it is unlikely
that externalities per se were consciously related to the issue
being resolved. These legal and moral experiments may be hit-
and-miss procedures to some extent but in a society that
weights the achievement of efficiency heavily, their viability
in the long run will depend on how well they modify behavior
to accommodate to the externalities associated with important
changes in technology or market values. 9
The leap from assuming efficiency-maximizing behavior of individ-
uals to assuming efficiency-maximizing behavior of a society seems,
in retrospect, too hastily made in this passage, especially in light of
growing evidence that government is frequently involved in redistri-
butive activities that actually reduce efficiency.30 Disquiet over this
point has prompted efforts, not as yet wholly convincing, to show
that the form of common-law adjudication may predispose it to
efficient outcomes quite apart from any social consensus in favor of
efficiency that the judges could be expected to share.31
That we do not yet have a generally accepted theory of why and
how the common law might have come to be an instrument for
21 Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57-2 Am. EcoN. Rlv. 347, 350 (1967)
(emphasis added).
31 See ECONoMIc ANALYSiS OF LAW 404-07.
1, See id. at 404-405; Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common
Law, 7 J. LEGAL Swm. 393 (1978); Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of
Efficient Rules, 6 id. at 65 (1977); Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 id. at 51
(1977). For criticism see ECONOMIc ANLYsIs OF LAW 439-41; Cooter & Kornhauser, Can Litiga-
tion Improve the Law Without the Help of Judges, J. LEGAL STuD. (forthcdming); Landes &
Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 259-84 (1979).
1979]
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promoting economic efficiency does not, of course, warrant disre-
garding the numerous studies that have found a convergence, fre-
quently subtle and unexpected, between the common-law rules and
the implications of economic theory. These studies are not limited
to the occasional instances where the courts adopt a virtually ex-
plicit economic formulation of the law, as in the Hand formula of
negligence liability.2 They embrace a variety of doctrines in fields
as diverse as admiralty, contracts, arbitration, remedies, torts-
indeed in every'one of the common-law fields. Assumption of risk,3
the rules for computing salvage awards in admiralty,34 the excep-
tions to the nonenforeceability of gratuitous promises, 35 the distinc-
tion between fraud and unilateral mistake,38 the rules governing
commercial arbitration, 37 the degrees of homicide,3 the defense of
impossibility in contract actions,3 9 the limited scope of the right to
privacy," and the appropriation system of water rights,4' are a few
examples of specific doctrines and practices that have been ex-
plained on efficiency grounds.
It is of course possible to quarrel with some of the economic
explanations of common-law rules that have been offered. The
Clarkson-Miller-Muris explanation for the refusal of the common
law to enforce penalty clauses in contracts is a particularly vulnera-
ble example. 42 That refusal, which apparently promotes ineffi-
ciency,43 remains a major unexplained puzzle in the economic theory
of the common law, and there are others. Nevertheless, it is striking,
3' See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); Conway v.
O'Brien, 11 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940). See also ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 122-24.
33 See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 127-28.
See Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An
Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STuD. 83, 100-05 (1978); cf. id. at 106-08
(the rule of general average in admiralty).
3' See Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411 (1977);
cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 34, at 109-10 (1978) (physician's entitlement to his fee from
an unconscious person whom he treats without a contract).
31 See Kronman, supra note 13.
" See Landes & Posner, supra note 31, at 245-53.
3' See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 174.
3' See Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
10 See Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. Rlv. 393 (1978); cf. Posner, Privacy,
Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BuFF. L. REv. 1, 40 (1979) (conditional privilege in a defamation
suit against a former employer who gives a character reference for an employee).
" See, e.g., Burness & Quirk, Appropriative Water Rights and the Efficient Allocation
of Resources, 69-1 AM. ECON. REv. 25 (1979).
42 See Clarkson, Miller & Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?,
1978 Wis. L. REv. 351.
13 See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 93-94; THE ECONOMICS OF CoNTRACr LAW, supra note
13, at 224-25.
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at least to this perhaps biased observer, how wide a range of rules,
outcomes, procedures, and institutions appear to support the effi-
ciency hypothesis.
B
The existing evidence for the efficiency hypothesis is not of such
power as to invite complacency, however. As we have seen and shall
see, the economic theory of the common law has encountered some
serious problems. But these problems do not include the alleged
inadequacy of "efficiency" (which I use in the sense of wealth max-
imization) as a normative criterion. The positive theory says only
that the common law appears to be an engine of wealth maximiza-
tion, not that it should be one. But since several recent writers have
questioned this attempt to divorce "is" and "ought," the issue de-
serves attention here.
Dworkin" and Kennedy 5 have argued that since efficiency is a
function of the initial distribution of rights, the economic theory of
law cannot be validated without some theory of the initial distribu-
tion, a theory these writers assume economics cannot provide. But
their argument is, I believe, incorrect. If one starts with a system in
which a single man owns all of the wealth in the society, the alloca-
tion of resources that is efficient in the light of that distribution will
probably be different from what it would be if one had started with
a more equal distribution; nevertheless, both allocations are effi-
cient. Thus, if the common law simply takes for granted the existing
distribution of wealth and assigns rights and duties in such a way
as to optimize resource use given that distribution, the resulting
allocation of resources will be efficient. Moreover, as I have argued
elsewhere, the economic theory of law does prescribe an initial dis-
tribution of rights, at least in a general way (for example, each
person to own his own body and labor). 6
Michelman has made a different argument: that unless wealth
maximization can be shown to be an acceptable ethical theory, it is
implausible to attribute its adoption to the common-law judges.47
" R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 97-98 (1977).
43 Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. Rav. 1685,
1762-64 (1976).
19 See Posner, supra note 22, at 125-26.
11 See F. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Positive Economic Theory of Law
(n.d.) (unpublished manuscript on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). This
argument does not appear in the published version of the paper, cited in note 21
supra-owing, however, to a change in the scope of the paper rather than to.a change of mind
on Michelman's part.
1979]
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Two responses are possible. The first is that efficiency is a more
defensible ethical criterion than Michelman would admit,
especially in the context of judicial decisionmaking. Considerations
of the just distribution of wealth or other "justice" factors on which
a social consensus is lacking would introduce an unacceptable de-
gree of subjectivity and uncertainty into the judicial process. An-
other way of stating this point is that efficiency has always been an
important social value, and it may be the only value that a system
of common-law rulemaking can effectively promote." Second, the
recent work on the sources of the efficiency bias in common-law
adjudication suggests that one need not posit a preference for effi-
ciency on the part of the judges to explain how the common-law
system might generate efficient rules. The more extreme versions of
this view even argue that the common law would tend to become
efficient in the face of judicial hostility to efficiency as the ruling
criterion of judicial decisions." This view, however, is not yet widely
accepted. 0
Among other objections to the efficiency theory of the common
law that have been advanced are, first, the prevalence of nonecon-
omic rhetoric in judicial decisions, and, second, the poor quality of
much of the evidence-statistical data of the sort usually used to
verify social scientific theories appear to be largely lacking with
regard to the efficiency properties of common-law rules. The point
about rhetoric ignores the fact that the major economizing doctrines
of the common law preceded the development of an explicit eco-
nomic theory of law that might have made the specialized rhetoric
of economics available for use in judicial decisions. Just as people
were maximizing utility before the terms were invented by econo-
mists, judges may have been maximizing efficiency before the lan-
guage of economics gained currency in judicial opinions (indeed, it
still has not). Even modern businessmen, educated at business
schools in which heavy doses of economics are taught, tend not to
use the jargon of economics in their business dealings. Yet this fact
is not generally considered an effective refutation of the applicabil-
ity to business behavior of such basic economic concepts as profit
maximization and marginal cost.
The anomalies I mentioned earlier and the lack of quantitative
evidence are weaknesses in the efficiency theory of the common law
"1 See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 359 (arguing that courts lack effective tools of income
redistribution).
1' This is Professor Priest's view. See Priest, supra note 31.
5See note 31 supra.
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that cannot be brushed aside so easily. To be sure, with research
still in an early stage, the frequency and stubbornness-the signifi-
cance, in short-of the anomalies that have appeared cannot yet be
fully appraised. Yet it would be more surprising to find that the
common law had somehow remained totally immune from the redis-
tributive impulses that appear to dominate the other branches of
government today than it would be to find a mixture of redistribu-
tive and efficiency elements in the common-law doctrines and out-
comes, though perhaps with efficiency predominant. This raises the
question of the proper formulation of the positive economic theory
of the common law, a question to which I return below.
As for the paucity of quantitative testing of the efficiency hy-
pothesis, although it is surely to be regretted (it is due mainly to the
surprising, but remediable, dearth of statistics on most aspects of
the legal system"1 ), qualitative evidence ought not be rejected out
of hand. Indeed, the distinction between qualitative and quantita-
tive evidence is not always clear-cut. For example, Demsetz's study
of the emergence of individual property rights in primitive society
to which I referred can be viewed as a form of quantitative analysis
in which the researcher predicts that a change in the costs and
benefits of alternative rights systems will result in a corresponding,
and efficient, change in the nature of the rights system. Similarly,
Landes and I recently tried to test the economic rationality of rescue
law by predicting differences between land and sea rescue law based
on differences in the economics of rescue on land and on sea.52
Notwithstanding the above apologetics, the theory is young and
fragile and its results tentative rather than definitive. Further work
should dispel some of the anomalies, but it may well reveal new
ones. One possible outcome may be the development of a more in-
clusive theory of the common law that will include wealth maximi-
zation either as a special case, in the same way that Galileo's law
of falling bodies was shown by Newton to be a special case of a
general theory of gravitation, or as one explanatory variable among
several linked in a more complex model. Indeed, as suggested above,
it seems likely that the mature form of the positive economic theory
1' William Landes and I used a combination of federal-court statistics published by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and citation statistics that we ourselves compiled
from judicial opinions to test hypotheses regarding the use of precedent in the federal courts.
See Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. &
EcoN. 249 (1976). We have almost completed a statistical study of salvage awards by U.S.
and English admiralty courts, again based on statistics that we compiled, this time from
published summaries of the judicial opinions in salvage cases.
52 Landes & Posner, supra note 34, at 118-19.
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of the common law will predict at least occasional instances where
redistributive rather than efficiency concerns have shaped legal doc-
trines, especially in a period like the present wheri redistributive
elements are so conspicuous in the shaping of legislative, executive,
and administrative policymaking. This would still be an economic
theory of the common law, for it would assume that the common-
law doctrines were designed to maximize the wealth of some group,
but its focus would sometimes be on a group smaller than the society
as a whole. Conversely, some legislation is certainly efficiency-
enhancing rather than redistributive in its basic thrust (for exam-
ple, statutes of limitations, statutes punishing common-law crimes
such as murder and theft, and statutes providing for damages in
wrongful-death cases), and such legislation must be integrated into
the economic theory of law.
Even in a quite extreme form-a prediction that all common
law doctrines will eventually be shown to be based on efficiency
considerations-the positive economic theory has the cardinal vir-
tue of being the only positive theory of the common law that is in
contention at this time.5" Occasional suggestions are made of alter-
native positive theories of the common law, but they are so perfunc-
tory as to be, at the present time, quite unpromising.54 That is not
to say that any version of the efficiency theory must be accepted
merely because there are no competing theories. If the theory had
very little empirical support, one could take the position that there
is no positive theory of the common law worth paying attention to.
But despite our inability to explain in an entirely convincing way
why the common law should be efficient, and the incomplete and
equivocal character of the data that support the theory, at least one
can say that the theory deserves to be taken seriously, especially in
its more moderate form of a claim that efficiency has been the
predominant, not sole, factor in shaping the common-law system.
Without meaning to wrap myself in the prestige of the physical
sciences, I note a resemblance between my view of the present state
of the positive economic theory of the common law and the view
recently expressed by a distinguished physicist of the so-called
"standard model" of the early universe:
13 The extreme form provides a useful working hypothesis. One can fruitfully begin an
analysis of a common-law doctrine by looking for an efficiency rationale; one cannot, how-
ever, always be assured of finding such a rationale.
s See, for example, Greenawalt's criticism of Dworkin's effort to sketch a "rights-based"
positive theory of law. Greenawalt, Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REv. 991,
1010-15 (1977).
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In following this account of the first three minutes, the
reader may feel that he can detect a note of scientific overcon-
fidence. He might be right. However, I do not believe that
scientific progress is always best advanced by keeping" an alto-
gether open mind. It is often necessary to forget one's doubts
and to follow the consequences of one's assumptions wherever
they may lead-the great thing is not to be free of theoretical
prejudices, but to have the right theoretical prejudices. And
always, the test of any theoretical preconception is where it
leads. The standard model of the early universe has scored
some successes, and it provides a coherent theoretical frame-
work for future experimental programs. This does not mean
that it is true, but it does mean that it deserves to be taken
seriously.55
Astronomy resembles economics in that it provides little scope for
controlled experimentation. That is one reason for the tentativeness
of Professor Weinberg's endorsement of the standard model. The
proper posture toward the efficiency hypothesis of the common law
is one of greater tentativeness, yet it too "has -scored some suc-
cesses" and "provides a coherent theoretical framework for future"
research.
I do not wish to leave too one-sided an impression of the re-
search activity in the law-and-economics field. Exploring the effi-
ciency hypothesis is only one facet of that activity. One can study
the law from the standpoint of positive economics without employ-
ing the hypothesis. And one can study it from the standpoint of
normative economics as well, as Calabresi's important work illus-
trates. My point is not that positive economic analysis, and in par-
ticular the efficiency hypothesis, is the only valid application of
economics to the law, but, to repeat, that it is a mode of analysis
that must be taken seriously by anyone interested in understanding
our still largely judge-made legal system.
C
What lies ahead in law and economics, and, in particular, in the
positive economic analysis of law? I propose to address this question
by considering the changes in the law-and-economics field since my
last general article on the subject, written four years ago. 56 My as-
sumption is that recent trends provide the best, although not neces-
" S. WEINBERG, THE FIRST THREE MINUTES: A MODERN VIEW OF THE ORIGIN OF THE
UNIVERSE 119 (1977).
1 See note 1 supra.
1979]
HeinOnline  -- 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 295 1978-1979
The University of Chicago Law Review
sarily a good, predictor of the future. As throughout this article, I
will focus on the economics of nonmarket legal regulation.
In 1975 the literature of the positive economic theory of law was
very small relative to the normative literature. My impression (I
have made no count) is that positive analysis is growing in relative
importance, and I expect this trend to continue. Lawyers are, as I
mentioned earlier, inveterately normative, and economists are not
far behind them in wanting to preach reform. But there seems to
be a growing belief-it is in part an aspect of the general growth of
interest in legal theory at the major law schools-that the scientific
study of law is both an interesting and a feasible pursuit. Not all
positive economic analysis of law has focused or will focus on the
efficiency hypothesis of the common law, but this hypothesis has
been a major stimulus to research and will undoubtedly continue to
be explored and refined in the coming years.
Also of note has been the broadening in the subject-matter
interests of the law-and-economics scholars. Four years ago the lit-
erature on the legal regulation of nonmarket activities was concen-
trated largely in the torts field. Recently there has been a surge of
work on the economics of contract and commercial law.57 Yet, de-
spite the fundamental role that the concept of property rights plays
in the discussion of the economics of law, the doctrines of property
law have received relatively little attention from the law-and-
economics scholars. I expect that this neglect will be remedied just
as the former neglect of contracts was. I also expect to see more work
in procedure, remedies, substantive criminal law, family law, intel-
lectual property, and other fields that have been rather neglected
in favor of tort and now contract law.
Another important trend has been toward greater rigor in the
economic writings on law." It is the concern with rigor that lies
behind the recent explosion of papers dealing with the mechanism
by which efficient common-law rules and outcomes are achieved. 59
There is growing dissatisfaction with attempts to answer the ques-
'57 Many of the selections in The Economics of Contract Law, supra note 13, were pub-
lished in the last four years, and several other papers on the economics of contract law have
appeared since. See Diamond & Maskin, supra note 28; Goetz & Scott, Measuring Sellers'
Damages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle, 31 STAN. L. REv. 325 (1979); Jackson, "Anticipatory
Repudiation" and the Temporal Element of Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry Into Con-
tract Damages in Cases of Prospective Nonperformance, 31 STAN. L. Rlv. 69 (1978); S.
Shavell, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Resource Allocation (Dec., 1978) (un-
published manuscript on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
11 See, e.g., .Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property
Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1979).
11 See authorities cited in note 31 supra.
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tion why the common law is efficient with vague references to
nineteenth-century ideology. I expect the development of an eco-
nomic theory of judicial motivation and behavior to occupy a promi-
nent place in the future work of law-and-economics scholars. In this
endeavor, scholars will no doubt draw heavily on the growing litera-
ture on the economics of the political process."
The apparently restless probing of the law-and-economics
scholars to bring ever more of the legal system within their pur-
view-precedent and other aspects of the judicial decisionmaking
process itself, privacy, adoption, and even primitive law"6-is a
source of disquiet to many. Why do these scholars, it is sometimes
asked, court ridicule by refusing to recognize any limitations on the
appropriate domain of the economic analysis of law? The answer is
that the limitations of economics cannot be determined a priori, but
only by the efforts of scholars to apply economics to hitherto unex-
plored areas of the legal system. One can reach the outer bounds of
a discipline only by pushing outwards. Eventually a point will be
reached where the economic theory ceases to have substantial ex-
planatory power. Then we will know the limitations of the economic
analysis of law; we do not know them yet.
IV. THE ABUSE OF ECONOMICS IN LAW
Having given an introduction to the history and progress of the
use of economics in legal reasoning and elaborated one particular
aspect of its use-the positive economic analysis of the common
law-I will offer two distinct instances of "abuse." One is Judge
Sneed's opinion in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,12 a good example of the
adage, "a little learning is a dangerous thing," applied to econom-
ics. The other is Professor Bloustein's abuse (in the sense of heaping
abuse, not misuse) of the economic model of human behavior in his
recent paper commenting on my economic analysis of privacy. 3 The
discussion of these two abuses should serve to clarify and illustrate
some of the points made in earlier parts of this article.
" See, e.g., Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & EcoN.
211 (1976).
11 See R. Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law (Working
Paper 007, Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, The University of Chicago,
March, 1979, copy on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
62 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
3 Bloustein, Privacy is Dear at Any Price: A Response to Professor Posner's Economic
Theory, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 429 (1978).
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A
Oppen concerned a suit by commercial fishermen whose liveli-
hood was impaired as a result of the Santa Barbara oil spill in 1969.
The defendants were oil companies that had joined together to drill
oil in the Santa Barbara Channel and whose joint venture had
caused the spill. It was stipulated that the spill and resulting dam-
age to the plaintiffs' livelihood were the consequence of the defen-
dants' negligence. The only issue was whether an injury to a busi-
ness expectancy as distinct from a vested property right was com-
pensable under the applicable tort law. The Ninth Circuit, in an
opinion by Judge Sneed, held that it was compensable. He bolstered
this conclusion by reference to Professor Calabresi's book on the
costs of accidents.64 The court's discussion, set forth in the margin,65
11 See note 15 supra.
65 Recently a number of scholars have suggested that liability for losses occasioned
by torts should be apportioned in a manner that will best contribute to the achievement
of an optimum allocation of resources. See, e.g., Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents 69-
73 (1970) (hereinafter Calabresi); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ.
1 (1960). This optimum, in theory, would be that which would be achieved by a perfect
market system. In determining whether the cost of an accident should be borne by the
injured.party or be shifted, in whole or in part, this approach requires the court to fix
the identity of the party who can avoid the costs most cheaply. Once fixed, this determi-
nation then controls liability.
It turns out, however, that fixing the identity of the best or cheapest cost-avoider is
more difficult than might be imagined. In order to facilitate this determination Calabresi
suggests several helpful guidelines. The first of these would require a rough calculation
designed to exclude as potential cost-avoiders those groups/activities which could avoid
accident costs only at an extremely high expense. Calabresi at 140-43. While not easy
to apply in any concrete sense, this guideline does suggest that the imposition of oil spill
costs directly upon such groups as the consumers of staple groceries is not a sensible
solution. Under this guideline, potential liability becomes resolved into a choice be-
tween, on an ultimate level, the consumers of fish and those of products derived from
the defendants' total operations.
To refine this choice, Calabresi goes on to provide additional guidelines which, in
this instance, have proven none too helpful. For example, he suggests an evaluation of
the administrative costs which each party would be forced to bear in order to avoid the
accident costs. Calabresi at 143-44. He also states that an attempt should be made to
avoid an allocation which will impose some costs on these groups or activities which
neither consume fish nor utilize those products of the defendants derived from their
operations in the Santa Barbara Channel. Calabresi at 144-50. On the record before us,
we have no way of evaluating the relative administrative costs involved. However, we
do recognize that it is probable that by imposing liability on the defendants some portion
of the accident costs in this case may be borne by those who neither eat fish nor use the
petroleum products derived from the defendants' operations in Santa Barbara.
Calabresi's final guideline, however, unmistakably points to the defendants as the
best cost-avoider. Under this guideline, the loss should be allocated to that party who
can best correct any error in allocation, if such there be, by acquiring the activity to
which the party has been made liable. Calabresi at 150-52. The capacity "to buy out"
the plaintiffs if the burden is too great is, in essence, the real focus of Calabresi's
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evinces a misunderstanding of the applicable economics.
Judge Sneed begins by noting that the economic approach re-
quires the court to identify "the party who can avoid the costs more
cheaply."" But he shies away from applying this criterion, on the
ground that "fixing the identity of the best or cheapest cost-avoider
is more difficult than might be imagined." 7 This is a curious obser-
vation in the setting of the case. The court interpreted the defen-
dants' stipulation as a confession of their negligence, which means,
at least as an approximation, that they had not thought it worth
trying to show that they were not, in Calabresi's terms, the cheapest
cost-avoiders. Why then should Judge Sneed have wondered
whether the defendants could more cheaply have avoided the harm
caused by the Santa Barbara oil spill, especially in the absence of
any allegation that the plaintiffs had been contributorily negligent?
In any event, it seems obvious that the fishermen were in no position
(by breeding a species of oil-resistant fish, or otherwise) to avoid the
damage; the oil companies were the cheaper cost-avoiders in Cala-
bresi's sense.
What follows in the opinion-an attempt to apply Calabresi's
detailed guidelines designed for cases in which the identity of the
cheaper cost-avoider is in serious doubt-is thus superfluous. It is
also confused. This part of the opinion begins with the suggestion
that "the imposition of oil spill costs directly upon such groups as
the consumers of staple groceries is not a sensible solution."" I
assume that by "staple groceries" Judge Sneed has in mind a prod-
uct in which neither fish nor oil is a significant input. The relevance
of such an example is obscure, since there is no tort mechanism by
which the manufacturers, sellers, or consumers of staple groceries
could be made to bear the costs of the Santa Barbara oil spill.
Continuing with his discussion of Calabresi's detailed guidelines,
Judge Sneed next states that an effort should be made to "avoid an
allocation which will impose some costs on those groups or activities
which neither consume fish nor utilize those products of the defen-
dants derived from their operations in the Santa Barbara Chan-
nel." 9 We are back to the staple groceries, an example of an activity
unrelated to the accident. Judge Sneed then states that it is proba-
ble that imposing liability on the defendants will result, at least
approach. On this basis there is no contest-the defendants' capacity is superior.
501 F.2d at 569-70.
" Id. at 569.
7Id.
99 Id.
" Id. at 569-70.
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partially, in just such an externalization. It is not clear why this
should be so, and he gives no reasons for his conclusion.
Having wandered among Calabresian guidelines that he does
not find particularly helpful, Judge Sneed finally lights on a helpful
one: "[T]he loss should be allocated to that party who can best
correct any error in allocation, if such there be, by acquiring the
activity to which the party has been made liable. . . . On this basis
there is no contest-the defendants' capacity [i.e., to buy out the
other party to the accident] is superior."70 There are some settings
where the merger of the interfering activities may be the correct
solution to an externalities problem' but it is improbable that the
correct solution to the problem of oil spills is to merge the commer-
cial fishing industry and the oil industry into one giant firm. And it
is impossible to defend placing liability on the oil companies on the
ground that liability would give those companies an incentive to
acquire the fishing industry.
With respect, it must be said that Judge Sneed's attempt to
apply Professor Calabresi's economic guidelines to the issue of lia-
bility in this case is not a success. The judge's conclusion that the
oil companies should be liable for the loss to the commercial fisher-
men even though the fishermen had no property right in fish they
had not yet caught seems correct as a matter of economics: only the
oil companies can take efficient measures to prevent or limit oil
damage to the fish, and making them liable to the fishermen will
give the oil companies the correct incentives to take those mea-
sures.12 But Judge Sneed's effort to articulate his reasoning in eco-
nomic terms was disastrous.
Of course it does not follow that because judges have difficulty
using economic reasoning explicitly, judicial opinions in which no
explicit attempt is made to apply economics are likely to make
implicit economic sense. Nonetheless, besides providing a caution-
ary example for judges minded to write in the language of econom-
ics, Judge Sneed's opinion in Oppen casts at least an oblique light
on the occasional suggestion that the positive economic theory of the
common law is implausible because judicial opinions rarely use the
explicit language of economics. Judge Sneed reached a result that
was economically sensible, but he was unable to articulate it satis-
,0 Id. at 570.
11 See Professor Baxter's interesting proposal for forcing airports to condemn the land
within the airport's primary noise contoir. Baxter & Altree, Legal Aspects of Airport Noise,
15 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 69-82 (1972).
72 This analysis is elaborated in Posner, Epstein's Tort Theory: A Critique, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 457, 467-68 (1979).
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factorily in economic terms. It is even less likely that his predeces-
sors of 50 or 100 years ago would have wanted or been able to cast
their opinions in explicit economic terms, for there was much less
awareness of the technical concepts of economics then than there is
today.
B
Professor Edward J. Bloustein, commenting recently on a paper
in which I undertook an economic analysis of the right of privacy,
used the occasion to question certain aspects of the economic model
of law.73 1 want to consider this part of his comment ather than his
specific reservations about my views on privacy, which I have dealt
with elsewhere .7
Professor Bloustein begins by stating:
The persuasiveness of Professor Posner's Article on the
economic theory of privacy hinges on his apparent success in
transforming, in classical rationalistic fashion, a complex and
disorderly jumble of legal rules into a simple and unified
scheme of explanation. Unfortunately, in at least one impor-
tant sense, Posner's theory is simplistic, not simple, because it
accomplishes its objective by avoiding, rather than confront-
ing, complexity. He seduces by reduction, rather than convinc-
ing by explanation. 7.
This statement brings out the fundamental difference between the
legal and the economic culture, or, more broadly, between the hu-
manistic and scientific approach. The goal of science, including
economic science, is to explain complex and seemingly unrelated
phenomena by reference to a theoretical model or construct, and the
power of a scientific explanation can be expressed as the ratio of the
different phenomena explained to the number of assumptions in the
theory. A simple theory tends to yield more, and more definite,
hypotheses than a complex one (a complex theory is more difficult
to falsify-and hence to confirm); if these hypotheses survive their
confrontation with the test data, the power of the theory to organize
diverse phenomena is confirmed. Abstraction is thus the essence of
scientific theory, and a successful theory is bound to ignore a good
deal of the apparent differences between phenomena-for example,
in Galileo's law of falling bodies, the differences between apples and
73 Bloustein, supra note 63.
71 See Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, supra note 40, at 24-25 n.54.
75 Bloustein, supra note 63, at 429 (footnote omitted).
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oranges or stones and bricks. The legal scholar, however, is not
oriented toward finding a simple theoretical structure, economic or
otherwise, beneath "a complex and disorderly jumble of legal
rules." He may note and deplore logical inconsistencies within the
jumble, but the idea that it might conceal an inner, and simple,
economic logic is unlikely to occur or to appeal to him, and the
proposal of such an idea may strike him as "pretentious and immod-
est."76
The reasonable kernel in such a reaction is the sense that a
practicing lawyer cannot ignore any part of the jumble. An eco-
nomic approach that explained 90 percent of some set of legal rules
or outcomes would be judged strikingly successful by the standards
of social science, but it would leave the legal practitioner with a
hollow feeling if he had a case to which the unexplained 10 percent
of the precedents were relevant. Perhaps that is why many legal
scholars are suspicious of the application of economics to law. They
feel that more is needed to explain 100 percent of the outcomes and
that the whole 100 percent must be given some explanation, how-
ever flabby, lest the practitioner be caught with nothing to say when
asked to interpret or distinguish a precedent arguably applicable to
his case.
There is a confusion of levels here. The virtues-and I regard
them as genuine virtues-of the practicing lawyer include plausibil-
ity, moderation, a decent respect for conventional opinion, an abil-
ity to manipulate an ambiguous rhetoric of right, justice, and fair-
ness, and other qualities and skills-rhetorical and forensic-that in
scientific research are not virtues, blat often vices. Bloustein's mis-
take is to expect social scientific writing about the legal system to
resemble the way in which the practicing lawyer, or the academic
lawyer who thinks like a practicing lawyer, writes about the legal
system.
One of the most common criticisms of the economic analysis of
law, as of economics in general, is that it rests on the unrealistic
assumption that people are rational maximizers of their self-
interest. Bloustein embraces this criticism; he thinks it especially
unrealistic to assume that criminals are rational maximizers.7 But
the criticism rests on two fallacies. The first, which is surprising to
find in the age of psychoanalysis, is that introspection provides the
only reliable evidence of motivation. Bloustein is not conscious that
he is making rational-maximizing calculations when he decides to
See id. at 452.
See id. at 431-34.
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go to the theater or read a book or accept the presidency of Rutgers,
and he therefore infers that the rational model is inapplicable to
him and a fortiori to those who commit crimes. But the idea that
the only springs of human action are fully thought out decisions is
naive. One does not have to be a Freudian to realize that much
purposive human action is formulated at the unconscious level.
The second misunderstanding underlying the attack on the
realism of the economist's assumption of rational self-interested
behavior is the view-an unarticulated but unmistakable premise
of Bloustein's discussion-that the way to test a theory is to com-
pare its assumptions directly with reality. Followed consistently,
this approach would lead, as Professor.Alexander Rosenberg, a phi-
losopher of science, has pointed out, to the absurdity of rejecting
Newton's first law ("in the absence of forces acting upon it, a body
remains at rest (or in uniform rectilinear motion)") on the ground
that its antecedent condition (or assumption)-the absence of
forces-is never realized .7 Rosenberg also points out that among the
antecedent conditions for the kinetic theory of gases law to hold "are
conditions imcompatible with already entrenched laws of na-
ture. . . .Thus, we infer the falsity, and not merely the inapplica-
bility, of the kinetic theory of gases to the actual behavior of
gases. ' 79 Yet Rosenberg goes on to note that "though not merely
strictly inapplicable but also false, the classical kinetic theory is
plainly useful and relevant. It constitutes imperfect knowledge. For
a range of values of pressure, temperature, and volume, it provides
results which can be relied upon up to certain limits. '8
Rosenberg explains that the same is true of economics.8' Var-
ious assumptions commonly made in economic studies, such as per-
fect competition, perfect knowledge, and instantaneous adjust-
ments by producers to changes in the conditions of demand and
supply, are "false," but they do not falsify the studies that utilize
them. For example, the effect of an excise tax on the price and
output of the taxed good is often studied using a model of perfect
competition. The model contains assumptions or antecedent condi-
tions that are not reflected in reality, but it yields correct qualitative
results (price rises and output falls) in the normal case, and tolera-
bly reliable quantitative results. Rosenberg goes on to point out that
the kinetic theory of gases has been progressively improved by refin-
ing its assumptions (in just the same way that Galileo's law of
' A. ROSENBERG, supra note 24, at 187.
7" Id. at 188.
'Id.
" See id. at 189-93.
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falling bodies was refined to take account of air pressure so that the
anomalous behavior of feathers could be explained) and that a simi-
lar process is under way in economics. This process is illustrated by
the development of models that assume uncertainty instead of cer-
tainty, imperfect competition instead of perfect competition, or
other more realistic approximations of the behavior being modeled.
Bloustein might conceivably accept the above but argue that
the behavior of criminals is outside the domain of current economic
models, just as the behavior of a falling feather is outside of the
domain of-cannot be predicted by-the law of falling bodies as
originally formulated. Bloustein may be correct, but this is not a
question to be resolved a priori: the assumption that criminals re-
spond to incentives in the form of more severe or more certain pun-
ishment is not so implausible as not to be worth testing empirically.
Yet Bloustein, while deriding the unrealism of assuming that a per-
son deciding whether to commit a crime is a rational maximizer of
his self-interest, completely disregards-he does not even cite-
growing evidence that the economic model predicts criminal be-
havior with greater accuracy than any competing positive theory
of such behavior.12 The criminal reacts to changes in "price,"
whether it is the "price" of substitute legitimate employment or the
severity of the criminal sanction or the probability of its imposition,
in the same way that law-abiding people react to changes in price
and cost. This evidence provides a reason for regarding the economic
model of criminal behavior as "true" in an important sense, al-
82 Bloustein's discussion of the economics of crime, Bloustein supra note 63, at 431-34,
is inaccurate in several respects. The most important of these is, as mentioned in the text,
that he overlooks the empirical literature supporting the economic model of criminal behav-
ior. See the authorities cited in EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 165 n.1. For some later additions
to the literature, see Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts
and Additional Evidence, 85 J. POLIICAL ECON. 741 (1977); Ehrlich & Mark, Fear of Deter-
rence: A Critical Evaluation of the "Report of the Panel on Research on Deterrent and In-
capacitative Effects," 6 J. LEGAL Sum. 293 (1977). Bloustein makes no mention of this
literature in stating that "most authorities" are skeptical regarding the deterrent effect of
criminal punishment. Bloustein, supra note 63, at 434. The statement is conceivably sup-
portable with regard to capital punishment, but not with regard to other forms of criminal
punishment. Bloustein overlooked the economic evidence though it is discussed on the same
page of my book from which he quoted another passage.
Also, Bloustein incorrectly characterizes the second edition of Economic Analysis of Law
as acknowledging that the purely economic approach of the first edition to crime was inade-
quate. Bloustein, supra note 63, at 431-32. The second edition simply makes explicit addi-
tional features of the economic model, as part of a general expansion in the discussion of sub-
stantive criminal law in the second edition. Compare R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW
357-74 (1973) with EcoNomIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 163-78. His remark that the second edition
recognizes "crimes of passion" as an exception to the economic theory of crime is the exact
opposite of what the second edition states. Compare Bloustein, supra note 63, at 432, with
ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 165.
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though from another standpoint it may seem to rest on a severely
reductionist conception of the criminal mentality.
Bloustein also states that "[iln using the concept of
'externality' the economist is, in effect, abandoning the market
place as a determinant of social choice and disguising his abandon-
ment by the use of a term which looks like a term of economics." 3
The idea that externalities represent an embarrassment for the posi-
tive (or the normative) economic theory of law is 180 degrees off the
mark. One of the main purposes of law, from an economic stand-
point, is the control of externalities. The Oppen case is illustrative.
Property rights and liability rules, including the liability rule in-
voked in Oppen, are devices by which people are given incentives
to internalize the costs and benefits of their actions so that an effi-
cient allocation of resources is achieved. Yet Bloustein thinks well
enough of his point to repeat it: "The concept of 'external' costs and
benefits is an invitation to go outside the market-place, outside the
scope of economic analysis -and into the arena of public policy and
social ethics. 8 ' He fails to understand that economics is not just the
study of behavior in explicit markets free of externalities. It is also
the study of imperfect and implicit markets and of the social con-
trols, including property rights and liability rules, by which the
(potential) externalities in such markets are internalized.
Among his other economic errors, Professor Bloustein garbles
the economic concept of scarcity. He asks: "Is a name or a likeness
a 'scarce resource,' subject to the laws of the marketplace? In eco-
nomic terms, the commercial use of a name costs the owner nothing;
. . .there is no. . . 'opportunity cost' to the use of a name." ' It is
true that it costs me nothing to acquire my name, but it may cost
me a great deal to make that name commercially valuable. And
even if it would not cost me anything, there would still be an oppor-
tunity cost to the use of the name. The opportunity cost to a celeb-
rity of the commercial use of his name is simply the price he could
get from the next highest bidder. If the commercial use of his name
is valuable, that price, and hence the opportunity cost, will be posi-
tive. Perhaps Bloustein thinks there is no social opportunity cost
because additional uses would not reduce the value of existing uses:
the name is a good in inexhaustible supply. But this, too, would be
incorrect. If anyone could use a particular celebrity's name in adver-
tising, the total advertising value of the name would be less than if
83 Bloustein, supra note 63, at 435.
U Id. at 452.
91 Id. at 448.
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the celebrity were permitted to limit its use. What would Hertz gain
from using O.J. Simpson's name and likeness in its advertising if
every other car-rental company could use his name and likeness as
well? Perhaps Bloustein does not think advertising is a genuine
social good. But he does not say it is not one, and if he did, he would
be making a point that is increasingly rejected by economists.86
The economic approach to law is not above criticism, but it
should be informed criticism. I hope this paper will promote such
criticism by clarifying the nature and aims of the economic ap-
proach and by dispelling some prevalent misconceptions and erro-
neous criticisms of it.
" See, e.g., Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. PoLrTcAL ECON. 729 (1974).
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